Winter Quarter

The course will pursue a two-fold aim. On the one hand, we will have advanced graduates (at least after portfolio) present a chapter of their dissertation, to receive feedback from the instructor and their peers. On the other, we will have at least a few sessions on "AI epistemology", in connection with the conference by the same title, which will be held at UCI (Feb. 6-7, 2026) and Professor Pedersen's visit from Yonsei University (Seoul), as part of an exchange between the SOH and Underwood International College, led, for this year, by Professors Pedersen and Coliva, on the theme of "AI Epistemology". Topics will include (but will not be limited to) AI, knowledge and understanding; trust and trustworthiness in relation to AI; AI and mathematical and scientific knowledge. Space will be limited. Interested students from both the DoP and LPS are kindly requested to get in touch with me to indicate which aspects of this seminar will be of most interest to them.

We find ourselves in the world – amidst all this (whatever it is). Inquiry is directed at some thing(s) or other in this reality. What is there to be discovered? And what contributions do we make to reality via our engagement with it (through our conceptualizations and other activities)? These two questions are the motivation for this seminar. We will examine whether they even make sense, what presuppositions either makes and how some philosophers have tried to answer them. The basis of our discussion will be a number of contemporary (or relatively recent) papers on these issues.

Course Overview: This course will cover some core topics in contemporary epistemology, including applied epistemology. Potential topics include Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, the epistemology of religious belief, truth as a fundamental good (veritism), epistemic risk, ignorance, and the epistemology of education.

Political Philosophy: Rawls.  In this seminar we’ll do a close reading of John Rawls’s landmark work, A Theory of Justice (1971), noting the many disputes it generated in the 50 years since its publication.  We’ll also read some critical literature, with special focus on Rawls's inattention to hierarchy, money and finance.

Propositional attitudes are attitudes like believing, asserting, wishing, intending, and fearing. These (many people think) are attitudes towards propositions, e.g., that the lights are off, or that there is a cat nearby. We will read a mix of contemporary and classic texts, starting with Frege and Brentano. The first portion of the quarter will introduce our general topic, and some of its distinctive problems, and puzzles. During the course, we’ll pay special (but not exclusive) attention to belief. What, for example, is its relationship to assertion? We will consider Frege puzzles, the de se, the semantics of attitude reports, and whether what we believe is sensitive to an implicit question under consideration. How fine grained are our beliefs? Are statements that ascribe propositional attitudes to others well understood as a sort of translation? We will also consider the extent to which fear, and other emotions, are belief-like propositional attitudes. No prerequisites.

I would like to encourage you to sign up for a seminar that I am offering in the Winter Quarter 2026, Crime and Punishment: Philosophical Perspectives.  The seminar, which is open to both law students and graduate students in philosophy, will explore a broad range of issues concerning the philosophy of punishment and the relevant criminal law.  Topics will likely include: retributivist and utilitarian justifications for punishment; what mens rea or mental state should be required for criminal liability; the moral and legal relevance of the distinction between purposely and knowingly causing harm; whether fortuity or "moral luck" justifies punishing completed crimes more than attempts; the defenses of justification (e.g. self-defense and necessity) and excuse (e.g. duress and provocation); the insanity defense (with attention to the free will/ determinism debate); and the proper scope of hate or bias crimes.  For law students, no prior background in philosophy is required or assumed; for philosophy students, no prior legal background is required or assumed.

Short weekly reaction papers will be required, as well as a final paper (13-17 pages).  The seminar readings will include legal decisions and the writings of legal scholars and philosophers.  All the materials will be available on Canvas.

The class will be held in the Law School, Room 3500, on Wednesday from 3:30-5:30.

Because the credit hour requirements and academic schedules of the Law School and the School of Humanities differ, philosophy students interested in taking this class will sign up for it as an Independent Study, Phil 298, listing me as the instructor.  For philosophy students, classes will begin on January 14 and end on March 25, with no class on March 4, for a total of ten classes.

The class will satisfy the value theory requirement of the philosophy department.  It is equivalent in that respect to Philosophy 230.  Up to seven philosophy graduate students may enroll in the class.

Twice in the past, I have taught seminars with both law students and philosophy graduate students, and they have been very rewarding experiences for both professor and students.