Fall Quarter

Intuitively, concepts can undergo change. What conceptual change comes to depends on what is meant by “concept.” In this class, we’ll consider conceptual change under various disambiguations. Readings include: Susan Carey on mental representations in core cognition, and maturation; Mark Wilson on conceptual dynamics in science; David Chalmers on how to represent conceptual continuity through theory change; and Sally Haslanger on the relationship between conceptual change and social change.

Rational, religious and delusional hinges

In this course, we will delve into the intriguing realm of Wittgenstein's ideas and hinge epistemology, examining their potential applications in various domains. One significant area we will explore is the intersection of these concepts with religious beliefs and delusional phenomena, including a connection to conspiracy theories. Throughout our discussions, we will tackle topics such as the structure of justification and knowledge, relativism, deep disagreement, faith and reason, and the intricate relationship between reason and madness.

To enrich our exploration, we have invited esteemed guests who will share their expertise. Alongside our own Anna Boncompagni and Duncan Pritchard, who will shed light on the application of Wittgenstein's ideas and hinge epistemology to religious beliefs, John Campbell (Berkeley) will be presenting on hinge accounts of delusions. Additionally, Lisa Bortolotti (Birmingham) will discuss with us her work on delusions and conspiracy theories.

We will start with Wittgenstein's On Certainty and by exploring prominent iterations of hinge epistemology. From there, we will delve into the fascinating realm of religious epistemology. In particular, we will examine the intricate relationship between Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Cardinal Newman's The Grammar of Assent, as well as explore recent developments of Wittgenstein's position through the lens of quasi-fideism. Building on this foundation, we will investigate the possibility of distinguishing between rational and irrational hinges and how this distinction might aid our understanding of delusional experiences. Finally, we will broaden our perspective by considering the potential extension of this distinction to account for conspiracy theories.

Same as LPS 221.